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CHAPTER TWO
THE INCOMPLETE WHOLE:
THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
OF THUCYDIDES’ HISTORY
BERNARD J. DOBSKI
The History of Thucydides concludes in the middle of a sentence about
the 21st year of a war that spanned 27 years. We can resist the temptation
to conclude that Thucydides’ work is unfinished not only because our
author informs us that he lived several years after the war ended (V.26,
II.65.12, I.1)*, but because the structural outline of his work shows why its
abrupt and apparently incomplete conclusion is necessary. Careful attention
to the broader architecture of Thucydides’ work reveals a dialectical
movement from the tensions within political justice as the Greeks
understood it to a presentation of nature as a standard for morality and
politics. But in Thucydides’ hands, nature as a standard by which one can
judge politics and moral virtue must ultimately be exchanged in favour of
a return to the standard of Greek—and especially Athenian—politics albeit
a return mediated by the foregoing reflections on the limits to political life
and human nature. The necessity of this return to the conventions of
Athenian politics is thus at once occasioned and conditioned by an
awareness and acceptance of the fundamental limits (intelligible and
otherwise) to the moral and political categories that define human life, an
awareness reflected in the puzzling conclusion of the History.
An ending that seems so problematic to so many scholars and readers
of this epic appears less so when one refuses to impose on Thucydides a
view of what his work is or should be. For those who insist on calling his
work a “history” would do well to observe that his work has no official
title, that the Greek word for history never once shows up in the work, and
that the classical definition of history from which our modern conception
*

Thucydides’ work has no official title. I follow convention by referring to it as
the History. All references to Thucydides’ History are in standard book, chapter,
and, where relevant, sentence, form. Translations are mine and based on the Jones
and Powell Oxford Classical Text.
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derives appears first in Aristotle’s Poetics, which is to say some two
generations after Thucydides wrote. We must therefore relax our
expectations that his work should cover the full 27 year war and all that
happened in it. If we instead approach the History more naively, allowing
ourselves to wonder why Thucydides includes and omits what he does –
that is, if we are attentive to the artistry of the History, then we can enter
into that dialogue to which his History constantly beckons us. Attention to
the artistic elements at work in the History is hardly ground-breaking. This
path to the political wisdom of the History has already been charted by its
best readers (Hobbes 1989, 577; Rousseau 1979, 239; Nietzsche 1977,
559-59). By following in their footsteps, I merely hope to foreground
elements of the work’s artistic polish that all too often remain undertheorized by contemporary scholarship on Thucydides.

The End and Beginning of the History
In the last sentence of the book, Thucydides reports that the Persian
satrap Tissaphernes “went to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to Artemis”
(VIII.109). This final sentence, whose concluding word is “Artemis,”
recalls the first words of the History which are “Thucydides an Athenian.”
If we take seriously Thucydides’ artistry in composing the History in the
way that he does, then we are entitled to wonder what he intends his
readers to think by opening his work with his own name, the name of an
Athenian male, and by concluding it with the name of a goddess, the twin
sister of Apollo, whose temple is in Persia and who represents the power
of generation (see Munn, 2000). Scholars of the History have long noted
the presence of dyads within the History, some more obvious than others:
peace-war, motion-rest, Greekness-barbarianism, Athens-Sparta, justicenecessity (see chiefly Strauss 1963). But if we take seriously this pairing
of Thucydides and Artemis, a pairing that would substitute our author for
the embodiment of divine reason, then we might add to the list the
following dyads: human-divine, male-female, and reason-generation.
Since they open and close the History, Thucydides invites us to wonder
what these dualities mean for everything that comes between them. The
immediate contexts of both the beginning and conclusion of the History
shed light on this question.
Tissaphernes goes to Ephesus to sacrifice to Artemis because he needs
to heal a breach between himself and the Spartans, his nominal allies in
what had become a joint war against Athenian imperialism. Among the
many reasons for this breach is the fact that the Spartans had been helping
Greek cities in Asia Minor defect from Persian rule. The citizens of one in
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particular, Andtandrus, sought help from the Spartans because one of
Tissaphernes’ lieutenants slaughtered the leading men of their neighbours,
the Delians, and he did so under the thinnest of pretexts. Naturally, the
Antandrians feared that they might be next (VIII.107-09). The Delians,
however, were not Persians but Greeks. They had moved to the Aeolic city
of Attramyttium because the Athenians had driven them from their homes
in an earlier effort to purify (yet again) the holy island of Delos (V.1), the
center of worship for Apollo. Tissaphernes thus sacrifices to Artemis to
propitiate the goddess on behalf of his lieutenant’s slaughter of the
inhabitants of her twin brother’s holy island.
As with “Artemis,” this story about the Delians draws our attention to
the beginning of the History, in this case to the archaeology wherein
Thucydides charts the emergence and growth of Greek civilization out of a
pre-Hellenic past whose “greatest achievement” belonged to Minos: he
subdued the rampant practice of piracy in the Mediterranean by seizing for
himself and his sons the Cycladic islands (of which Delos was one),
expelling their inhabitants (at that time, the Carians of Asia Minor),
colonizing them and “outlawing” any future piracy (I.4). It is by virtue of
Minos’ successes here that later generations could come to view piracy as
a shameful thing (I.8; Burns 2010, 36). But by casting Minos as little more
than the most powerful and successful pirate of his day, Thucydides also
revises the mythopoetic account of the archaic past wherein divine justice
governed the affairs of men. In its place, Thucydides intimates that men
were governed by the force of internal necessities and thus lacked the
moral freedom that would make divine justice intelligible. The concluding
scene of his History would suggest that affairs in the Mediterranean are
returning to this pre-Hellenic (i.e., barbaric) past. Not only are Greek
powers upsetting the affairs of those from Asia Minor, with Athens
reprising the role of Minos, but Tissaphernes, using a religious ceremony
to advance his political career, subordinates piety to the political interests
of his satrapy. The calculus of power recommends this move. At the end
of the History, the compulsory considerations of self-interest, and not piety
or divine justice, appear authoritative.
While Minos helps establish the peace and commerce that makes
Greekness possible, neither he nor his rule are “Greek.” What distinguishes
Greekness from all other pre-Hellenic life (as well as its barbaric future),
is a paradoxical love of victory. For the Greeks, as opposed to the
barbarians, victory—in political life (I.6.4) or in Olympic contests
(I.6.5)—is sought as confirmation of one’s superior nature. Such natural
superiority is revealed primarily through (what appears to be) the
voluntary restraint of one’s own power, a trait that Thucydides describes
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as “measured” (metria). The Spartan political elite revealed their superior
self-sufficiency to those they would rule by voluntarily adopting a style of
dress worn by the poor. The Olympic wrestlers did so by competing nude.
And the wealthy Athenians did so by discarding the adornments that
honored their autochthonous gods (tettigon, I.6.3; see Hornblower 1991,
26-27), distancing themselves from such deities, their ties to their
particular land that those gods represented and the neediness that both
their gods and their land signified. On the basis of such openness to nature,
and thus to the truth, the self-sufficient life-in-common that defines Greek
politics becomes possible (Dobski 2007, 100-2; 2010, 143-47). But this
also means that the core of Greek politics emerges from an unstable
combination of the desire to display openly one’s radical freedom, such as
one often finds in tyranny or imperial rule, with the need to devote one’s
self freely to the law. This is a volatile mix whose darkest implication
suggests that what we understand to be both injustice and justice
originates from the same source, namely the concern to overcome our
fundamental and enduring human neediness. That such a political
antithesis should share a common origin resonates poetically with many of
the dyads interwoven throughout the History, but none more so than the
“twin” bookends discussed above. But it remains unclear how Thucydides
understands the Greek openness to nature, at work in the desire to disclose
one’s greatness for all with eyes to see, to cohere with its concomitant
need to demonstrate such greatness through a public display of voluntary
self-sacrifice.
Thucydides’ final framing chapters point to a possible, if puzzling,
solution even as, or precisely because, they recall the opening of the
History. Just before his conclusion about Greek affairs in Persia,
Thucydides notes the emergence of the regime of The Five Thousand in
Athens, praising it as the best government the Athenians had in his
lifetime (VIII.97.2). This government was known for being “measured”
(metria) in part because it effected in its form a judicious mix of the one,
the few and the many. This remarkable, if short-lived, regime managed to
accommodate the ambitions of Alcibiades and the need for the consent of
both the oligarchs and democrats and it did so without either permitting
the tyrannical excess of one or subjecting all its parts to the rule of a single
principle. The “measured” quality that defined Greekness seems here to
consist in effecting a balance of particular contending forces, one that
recognizes their independent integrity within the entire community and
thereby refrains from trying to impose a single dominant view on its
multiple, discrete parts. But if this is true, then it seems the meaning of
Greekness has changed; in contrast to those early, wealthy Athenians, the
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parts that make up The Five Thousand do not attempt to display their
complete freedom which, in their case, might come through the mastery of
the city and its empire. And the balance that this regime effects between
the parts of the community is, unlike the Spartan elite, not predicated on
the belief that the voluntary sacrifice of one’s power (i.e., agreeing to
accept one’s limited role within the new order) constitutes the means by
which one part of the city can demonstrate its greatness and thus its claim
to rule over the others. What happened to produce this change in
Greekness?

Thucydides’ Speech
We can begin to unravel Thucydides’ approach to the “measure” of
Greekness by understanding Thucydides’ logos and how that logos is
revealed through the political action of the History. Much ink has been
spilled over Thucydides’ programmatic statements about his handling of
speeches and deeds (I.20-22) and justly so (Orwin 1989). Given the
difficulty of this famous passage, we shall limit ourselves here merely to
observing that Thucydides’ statements effectively blur the distinctions
between speeches and deeds, on the one hand, and between his concern
with historical accuracy and his own view of what was necessary on the
other, distinctions that he is so careful to draw and on which his explicit
remarks here insist. If we assume that Thucydides is in control of his
work, as he surely is, then we must resolve this apparent contradiction.
One possibility suggests itself. By insisting on such distinctions, his
explicit remarks compel us to question their integrity, thereby effectively
blurring the differences between them. By doing so, he can point to the
true character of such distinctions in a manner faithful to their absence
while avoiding the very fallacy he seeks to correct. Such indirectness
might prove unbelievable were it not for the argument, placed in the
mouth of one of the work’s most humane actors, showing the necessity of
such deception (III.43).
Now the significance of such blurring comes into focus when we
consider that Thucydides presents his historiographical principles in
competition with the logoi of the poets, and in particular the poetry of
Homer (I.10, 21). According to Thucydides’ presentation in the
archaeology, poets like Homer tend to magnify or adorn the truth. Later,
Thucydides links Homer to the political psychology defining Greekness
when he informs us that Homer sought victory in his own contests at
Delos (III.104); like the Olympic wrestlers whose self-display follows the
emergence of Greek politics, the blind poet wanted to display his superior
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nature for all with eyes to see. Thucydides’ artistry invites us to conclude
that the public display of one’s superior nature is a form of political
overstatement. If Thucydides is to defeat Homeric poetry, then his
treatment of speeches and deeds must not magnify or overstate the truth;
he must not “speak” hyperbolically by trying to preserve or insist upon
certain distinctions that might not otherwise exist.
In Book VIII we learn that the emergence of the measured Five
Thousand is precipitated by a “re-founding” of the Athenian democracy at
Samos (VIII.76). And this re-founding was set in motion by the murder of
Hyperbolus (VIII.73-4), Thucydides’ only reference to a prominent Athenian
whose actions were otherwise well known to classical authors like
Aristophanes (Peace 681, 690, 1319; Acharnians 846; Knights 1304,
1363; Clouds 551, 557, 623, 876, 1065; Wasps 1007; Thesmophoriazusae
840; Frogs 570 ) and Plutarch (Nicias 11, Alcibiades 10-15, Aristides 7). It
is not altogether fanciful to think that Thucydides, by showing how The
Five Thousand is made possible by the elimination of a kind of “political
hyperbole,” invites us to link his speech to the virtue of a community he
praises most highly. Perhaps the greatness of Thucydides’ speech, like the
“measure” achieved by parts of The Five Thousand, is revealed by its
refusal to claim to deserve victory on account of its voluntary self-restraint;
perhaps Thucydides improves on the “Olympian” Homer because his
handling of speeches and deeds reflects a restraint that conforms to the
truth about the relationship between the two, one which preserves their
interwoven partiality within the context supplied by the History and which
can only be grasped through the prism of Thucydides’ remarkable
indirection. Of course, as it turns out even The Five Thousand cannot
come into being without at least some hyperbole; Alcibiades’ reintegration
into Athenian politics, so critical to the success of this regime, is made
possible partly by his own exaggerations to the Athenian naval forces at
Samos (lit. uperballon, VIII.56.4, 81.2). If Thucydides’ work is to be a
“possession for all time” and not some fleeting political mirage, then his
“measured” speech must surpass the virtue of even this regime.
Book VIII begins with the Athenians, struck by news of the disaster in
Sicily, putting their affairs on a more moderate basis (VIII.1.3). But by the
end of Book VIII Athens is under a measured regime (VIII.97). One of the
critical steps along this path from moderate to measured is Athens’s
“voluntary” change from traditional democracy to the oligarchic rule of
The Four Hundred. This change was effected by the dialectical exchanges
of the oligarch Pisander (VIII.53); in his conversations with individual
defenders of Athenian democracy, Pisander convinced his reluctant
opponents, one by one, to set aside their hope that the war could yet be
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won if they retained their cherished ancestral regime. Similarly, the
Athenian ambassadors to Melos, through their conversation with the
Melians, sought to cure their interlocutors of their hopes that the gods, the
Spartans, or chance would help them avoid defeat and enslavement at the
hands of the Athenians (V.85-113). And in an earlier (and much
neglected) exchange between an Ambraciot herald and Athenian soldier
(III.113), we see dialogue reveal the truth about an annihilation so
extensive and so devastating that it surpasses belief, leading the wailing
and panic-stricken herald to abandon the pious task on which he was sent.
If Socrates is right that dialectic is like rubbing two sticks together
(Republic 435a), then Thucydides reminds us that such “back and forth,”
while illuminating, can also be politically destructive—especially when it
arises naturally (II.76). Thucydides casually drops this “aside” in his
account of the siege of Plataea. There his treatment of the daring Plataean
escape makes it clear that the ability to find “the measure” (ton metron;
III.20.4) is necessary if one hopes to be saved, even if it means that one
cannot also save the community and many of its members. If we are to
grasp in Thucydides’ speech his appreciation of “the measure,” one that
can save us even if it means foregoing some of our most cherished beliefs
and attachments, then we must read Thucydides’ History dialectically.
To this way of thinking then the History can be read as revealing
Thucydides’ own education (Dobski 2010, 131-32), one learned at the feet
of that violent teacher war (III.82). To access that education, we need to
remain attentive to the structure of the work, a structure that, as much as
its speeches and narrative, conveys an argument about the priority of
politics to human wisdom. For the purposes of the present sketch, we can
identify four major parts of that structure: Part One—Book II.1 to Book
IV.133, or more specifically to V.17; Part Two—Book V.18 to V.113;
Part Three—Book VI.1 to Book VII.87; Part Four—Book VIII. It is true
that these divisions follow the major acts of the war and that they coincide
with the “Books” that tradition gives us. But they also represent the steps
of an argument, internal to the History, whose logic I hope to clarify.
Needless to say, what follows can only constitute a sketch of the History’s
structure, one whose contours I draw more sharply than the History would
otherwise allow. Much that needs to be said will have to remain unspoken.

The Structure of the History: Part One
Thucydides opens Part One and Part Two by noting that his account of
the war will follow natural or seasonal chronology (II.1, V.20.2). He does
not follow the customs of his time by recording events according to who
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held high office (i.e., archons) or who won high honors at the time of a
particular event (i.e., Olympic victors). After all, people disagree about
when a particular term of office began or ended and the celebration of
religious festivals or athletic contests can be altered and even suspended
entirely by human agreement (V.20.2). The change of seasons, however,
occurs regularly and entirely independent of human agency. And yet in
both passages Thucydides identifies the years in question by referring to
archonships, Olympic games, religious festivals and priestess-ships (II.2,
V.20.1). Thucydides’ puzzling procedure here forces us to pose a question:
is the proper source of human guidance a nature that is the same always
and everywhere and knowable to the unaided human mind or are we to
take our bearings from the political community, whose laws and customs
vary from place to place and time to time? Throughout most of Part One,
Thucydides approaches this question solely from the perspective of the
political community. Framed largely by the career of the Argive priestess
Chrysis (II.2-IV.133), Part One examines a conception of politics which
understands itself to be an authoritative, self-sufficient whole, one to
which all else, even religious custom, is subordinate; as such the regular
movements of nature, of growth and decay, are irrelevant from the
perspective of the law. It is perhaps fitting then that we find early in this
Part Pericles’ famous Funeral Oration (II.35-46), a speech which gives
luminous expression to what political life can mean at its highest—the
glorious path to individual human fulfillment through a deathless
reputation unblemished by time and fortune. But of course, this is not all.
As even the casual reader of the History knows, Pericles’ eulogy is
followed immediately by the devastating plague at Athens (II.48-2.54).
And throughout the braided narrative of Book II, we learn of Athenian
alliances with the Macedonians and Odrysians (II.29, 80, 95-101), massive
and mighty kingdoms both, each on the fringe of civilized life and barbaric
existence (cf. also II.15.2 and 97.6-6). In this context, Pericles’ golden
words are like that partial solar eclipse recorded at II.28, one where the
stars can be seen at day-time: against the darkened backdrop of barbarian
constancy and the plague, the brilliant Periclean Athens shines, dimmed
perhaps, but not obscured by the less impressive, if longer lasting,
luminaries of Perdiccas and Sitalces. And yet, if part of what makes
Greekness distinct is a devotional submission to the common good, then
Thucydides’ artistry here, which suggests a deeper link between Greeks
and barbarians, leads us to wonder about the integrity of the element that
defines Greek politics. From this perspective, the first section of Part One
(II.2-III.85) examines the limits to a conception of politics rooted in divine
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and ancestral authority. And this entire section is framed by the Theban
assault on Plataea.
The initial Theban sally on the city is frustrated by Plataeans digging
through the walls of their private homes to coordinate their resistance
(II.3). By breaking down what separates them as particular individuals the
Plataeans courageously secure what is common to them all (cf. I.93.2).
Thucydides builds on this wonderfully rich image when he turns to the
first Spartan invasion of Attica. Faced with this threat Pericles ordered
those who lived in the countryside to move to the city and take shelter
behind its walls. As they did so, these people carried in with them the
doors, shutters and walls of their country homes (II.14). That the
Athenians clung to what privately separated them even as they “united”
(cf. II.16.2) proves disconcerting for a city that sought to place the good of
the community over that of the individual. And yet, as the experience of
the plague in Athens reveals, there is such a thing as being too close
together (II.53 and II.16-17); perhaps distance between us—such as is
provided by walls and doors—is necessary. To have a healthy city requires
more than just strong walls protecting “us” from “them”; it requires
striking a judicious balance between mixing together and separating its
own various distinct parts.
It is the genius of Pericles, a man most capable in speech and deed, that
he is able to “mix and separate” so effectively (I.139). For instance,
Pericles is the only speaker in the entire History to deliver a speech that
produced unanimity in his audience (I.140-144), getting his contentious
citizens to agree on all of his points both general and particular (I.145).
Later, when the Spartans ravaged the Attic countryside, Pericles sent the
knights, simmering with rage and resentment behind the walls of Athens,
on ships especially designed to carry horses to attack the Peloponnesian
coast. By placing the land-force par excellence on water (II.56; cf. II.17,
23; for another approach entirely, see II.31) Pericles was able to defuse
civic tensions. And this ability to join and separate parts of the city in
various combinations for the common good highlights Thucydides’
otherwise obscure reference to the long-standing Athenian practice of
using the city’s ancient fountain to consecrate marriages (II.15.5), unions
critical to the successful foundation of a community. In both cases, we see
that whether the “parts” are oligarchic and democratic or male and female,
“water,” or motion, can be used to elide the distinctions between them,
allowing one to create a union that also preserves particularity.
Of course, such unions can be fragile, especially when the moral and
political categories binding them possess this same kind of mixed quality.
Thucydides’ account of the origins of Greekness already anticipated some
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of the difficulties with a conception of justice that tries to combine a
radical love of freedom with devotional submission to the law. But these
difficulties are given their fullest treatment in the Corcyrean civil war
(III.69-85), whose report follows the pitiful surrender of Plataea to Sparta
and Thebes (68, especially 68.3; cf. II.3,14 and I.93.2). The sharp clash of
partisan interest in Corcyra punctures the image of a hermetically sealed
political community, one defined by a shared conception of the just and
the good. Driven by the compulsory power of the apparent good (III.82;
45), individuals are no longer able to articulate a vision of the common
good robust enough to convince them to set aside their own self-interested
pursuits. In Corcyra, peaceful and civilized life gives way to a complete or
nearly-complete Hobbesian State of Nature, one in which the laws of the
gods and of men are disregarded almost without shame. Almost. For while
the conception of politics as a self-sufficient whole rooted in divine and
ancestral authority might prove problematic, Thucydides prevents us from
dismissing political life completely. After all, even as they tear each other
apart, the Corcyreans do so in the name of or motivated by moral
categories (III.82.8), albeit ones now distorted by the pressures of the civil
war (Ahrensdorf 2000, 587-88). It seems that while one can bend the
meaning of words, one cannot do the same to human nature. Perhaps then
there is hope. Perhaps supremely talented individuals can look to nature as
a standard for their conduct of political affairs. Perhaps nature can
authorize laws whose weakness in the face of human passions suggested
that their power rested on little more than convention.
Thucydides appears to take up this alternative from III.86 to V.17,
where he presents the careers of two generals, Demosthenes, an Athenian,
and Brasidas, the outstanding Spartan, two men who, in many ways,
reflect opposed views of nature. It is true that both men possess truly
outstanding natures, ones whose virtues owe virtually nothing to the cities
they fight for. But Demosthenes approaches nature as a guide and thus a
limiting factor; one that can be used, imitated and perhaps even improved
upon, but not one that can be overcome and disregarded. Thus
Demosthenes’ initial failures in Aetolia (III.97-98) and his later successes
at Olpae (III.108, 110-11), Idomene (III.112), Naupactus (III.102) and
Pylos (IV.8-36) and even his later failure at Epipolae in Sicily (VII.43-45)
can be understood against the backdrop of the earthquakes, tsunamis and
volcanoes whose report introduces his story (III.87-89). Moreover,
Demosthenes’ successes here derive in no small part from attention to the
proper mixing and separating of forces (see 107.4, contrast Ambraciots
with the Mantineans at 108.3; 111.3-4). His victories thus recall Pericles’
unique ability to take the measure of and balance the contending forces of
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Athenian politics, one that Thucydides elsewhere suggests (II.102) is
predicated on a mechanistic view of nature that rejects the possibility of
providential gods who intervene in our affairs according to our
understandings of justice.
For Brasidas, on the other hand, alone in Thrace with an army full of
Helots, nature is his nature and not the principles of the material world
through which he marches on the way to more conquests. His greatness is
not the product of harnessing the physical world to fit his designs; the
greatness of Brasidas’ nature comes to sight in his sweeping disregard of
any and all concerns with the Spartan rule of law. It is what allows him to
break with his ally Perdiccas (IV.83), to procure deceitfully the revolt of
Athenian subjects (IV.84, esp. 86.6-7, 88, 105) and to openly and clearly
violate the truce signed by Sparta and Athens (IV.120-1, 123, 134). Like
an earthquake at the time of an eclipse and new moon (IV.52), Brasidas’
victorious march through Thrace exhibits an unbridled nature in motion
with no cosmic light to give it its bearings or to check its flow.
In the end however, the alternatives represented by Demosthenes and
Brasidas are inadequate from Thucydides’ perspective. Demosthenes’
attachment to a nature that is apparently indifferent to human affairs
reflects a particularly Athenian turn of mind, one whose openness to
nature represents the flip-side of a pious concern for what one might call
“divine” or unchanging wholes. Like the Athenians at Delos, whose
increasing efforts to liberate Apollo’s holy island from all that generates
and de-generates reflect a pious concern with unblemished wholes (I.8,
II.8, III.104, V.1, VIII.10), Demosthenes appears to operate militarily on a
view of nature whose mechanistic principles are unchanging (compare
Nicias at Minoa, III.51 with Demosthenes at Leucas, III.94). It is true that
his signature victory at Pylos derived from an appreciation of the nature of
that particular place (IV.3.2; cf. IV.4.3 contra Strauss 1963, 159). But his
strategy there was earned through the hard lessons of Aetolia, a strategy
that he used first against the Ambraciots and parts of which he appears to
re-create for a third time en route to Sicily (VII.26, 27 and 31; cf. IV.28,
30, 32 and III.97). Insofar as nature remains unchanging and intelligible to
Demosthenes, and therefore something that humans can manage for their
purposes, it is not entirely indifferent to human concerns. And when we
view his career as a whole Demosthenes appears as a man who, at crucial
moments, relies too much on trust (Orwin 1994, 122). He is too trusting of
his fortune in Aetolia (III.97, 98.4), too trusting in the stability of nature in
Sicily (and perhaps even at Pylos), and, for a man willing to contradict two
generals before Pylos (IV.3), he is too trusting in the judgment of Nicias at
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Syracuse (compare his judgment at VII.47.3 and 49.2-3 with his decision
at 49.4; see also his “last words” at VII.78.1 and 77).
Brasidas, on the other hand, cannot represent an adequate solution to
the problems of political life if only because he seems to seek to leave
behind political life completely. In being crowned by the Scioneans as an
Olympic champion (IV.121) and venerated by the Amphipolitans as the
founder of their colony (V.11), Brasidas wins those glories and honors
sought by aspiring tyrants (I.126) and which are reserved for only the most
revered, an immortality that belongs to those able to transcend political life
entirely. And yet, Brasidas can only win the open acknowledgment that he
seeks for himself by a kind of noble suicide—an act of selfless service to
the common good in pursuit of individual glory—in which he leaves behind
the means that allowed him to demonstrate his greatness in the first place
(Burns 2011, 520-21). There may be no greater illustration of the
incoherence at the core of Greekness than the illustrious end of this most
famous Spartan. It is particularly fitting that the transpolitical trajectory of
Brasidas’ career emerges against a backdrop in which the inhabitants of
Delos are expelled (V.1), Cleon is dispatched (V.10), Thucydides is exiled
from Athens (V.26.5, IV.105) and Chrysis is on the run from Argos
(IV.133). As the first ten years of the war come to an end, it seems that
everyone is leaving politics.

The Structure of the History: Part Two
Part Two offers something of a backlash against the problems posed to
regimes like Sparta by the natures of a community’s most impressive
individuals. In this Part, beginning at V.18, one encounters the text of a
series of treaties and alliances (V.18, 23, 47, 77, 79; see 36, 45, 50 for
even more treaties and alliances that are attempted but never consummated
and 31, 39, 32, and 41 for the details of alliances, an armistice, and a truce
that are discussed, but not recorded verbatim). These documents represent
the effort to concretize and thus stabilize the contending interests of parties
jockeying for power. What Pericles managed to keep in motion
domestically, these treaties try to stabilize “permanently” in the international
realm. But all of these treaties and alliances, forged under the awning of
the Peace of Nicias, fail; and they fail because they insist on the sharpness
of distinctions that political and human life do not allow, aspiring to a
fixity of particular interests and needs. Thus the absurd length of these
treaties (50 and 100 years respectively) and their detailed stipulations on
oaths, each more elaborate than the next (V.18.9, 23.4, 47.8-9), testify to
an implicit gap between what justice always requires and what we think
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our self-interest can at times demand (cf. Alcibiades’ “treaty” at V.77). Of
course, the failure of treaties here to secure their goals has more to do with
the limitations of the kind of political speech they represent than it does
the ever-shifting forces of politics. After all, the rule of Pericles and The
Five Thousand (both of which earn Thucydides’ genuine, if conditional,
praise, II.65, VIII.97) respect the dynamics of a community’s parts within
a coherent political whole. At the end of Book V, Thucydides illustrates
the limitations to political speech in the dialogue between Athenians and
Melians, the substance and outcome of which bears on the status of justice
among nations.
Contrary to the long-standing claim that the Athenians at Melos
represent hard-headed realists, it is the Melians, not the Athenians, who
introduce the “realist ethic”; they tell the Athenians it is not unreasonable
for men in their position to tell lies if such lies will save them (V.88). But
the Athenians reject the need to resort to deception to make their case and
instead insist upon a rhetorical candor that runs contrary to their political
objectives. It is in the very frankness of their famed Athenian thesis (that
the strong rule where they can and the weak suffer what they must) that
the Athenians reveal their moral concerns; they want the Melians to
surrender to them on the grounds of their self-evident superiority. For
them it is not so much that their “might” makes them “right” as it is that
their being “right” makes them “mighty.” But the Athenians fail to translate
the sign of their superior strength into evidence of their superior goodness.
Even more than that, the Athenians make the contradictory claim that their
virtue makes them noble and is thus its own reward even as it is the means
by which they are to earn rule over the Melians, a rule which in turn will
signify their superior worthiness. Though they would correct the naïve
hopefulness of the Melians, it is the hope of the Athenians for a world that
recognizes and rewards their superior goodness, a hope no less naïve than
that of the Melians, that needs correcting.
The Melian dialogue, by revealing the incoherence of the Athenians’
efforts, suggests that any attempt by purely human means to disclose
openly and candidly the link between superior moral goodness and
superior power requires a less direct route, a less candid route, a less
explicit route, one that cannot be captured in speeches and certainly not
captured in treaties. For while gods might yet bestow blessings and curses
upon human beings, they cannot be known to do so on the basis of the
moral understanding moving the Athenians here and at the core of Greek
politics. If we remain concerned with discovering an intelligible order to
our moral and political lives, then we must be open to the possibility that
the truth of about where we should look for those limits that may rightfully
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guide us—nature or custom—cannot be openly or explicitly revealed to
men.
This may explain why Thucydides notes at the beginning of Book VI
that the poetic accounts of the ancient past in Sicily are irrelevant from his
perspective (VI.2). If their claims of revelation cannot provide us with
knowledge about what they reveal, then we cannot confirm or deny their
stories about the monstrous Cyclopses and Lastrygonians, beings who lack
origin, terminus and detailed particularity (VI.2). We therefore need not
bother engaging these accounts. Thucydides thus draws a contrast here
with his approach to the poets in Book I and this contrast, combined with
his Sicilian archaeology, signals that he is going to start anew. In fact, in
Part Three (Books VI and VII), Thucydides doesn’t just set aside the
poetic treatment of the gods. He also is remarkably silent about those nonhuman motions that cause so much suffering in the rest of the History
(though see VI.70, VII.53 and 79). Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian
campaign focuses solely on human nature as it comes to sight through
Athens’ engagement with Syracuse.

The Structure of the History: Part Three
Syracuse represents the Athenian alternative to Athens (VII.55). Not
only is her government democratic, but her citizens are innovative,
deliberative, and daring. And yet they appear to combine these traits
without the frenzied erotic longing to rule that plagues her Athenian
counterparts. The purpose of reflecting on this engagement between the
two cities thus seems twofold: first, to show the political consequences of
an unrestrained eros and second, to see if it was possible for a community
that otherwise resembled Athens to regulate the erotic impulse to pursue
empire. Of the latter, Thucydides’ narrative shows Syracuse’s imperial
restraint to be the product of circumstance—the absence of power and
opportunity—not of a principled or lawful resistance to it. As for the
former, the erotic love of liberty found in the private romantic pursuits of
the Athenian tyrannicides (VI.53-59) becomes in Athens a tireless push for
democratic freedom and the limitless pursuit of empire: first Syracuse,
then Italy, then Carthage, then Egypt, then Sparta, at least if Alcibiades is
to be believed (VI.90; VI.18). In her citizens the pursuit of empire
becomes the limitless pursuit of gain, or comfort or security (VI.24.3). In
seeking mastery over the entire Mediterranean Athens aspires to an
unrivaled freedom from anything that might serve to limit her as a
community or as individuals. One senses that her imperial trajectory, like
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that of Brasidas earlier, finds its logical conclusion in the transcendence of
political life altogether.
Athens at its peak, Periclean Athens, proved so successful because it
largely managed to respect and preserve the political distinctions—and the
tensions between them—from which the city’s political energies derived.
But in pursuing the conquest of all of Sicily, Athens sought to overcome
or disregard any such distinctions as unnecessary limits on its own erotic
ambitions. The results of such an effort prove disastrous. Thus we see the
Athenians, in their daring night attack on the heights above Syracuse, fail
to take Epipolae because the darkness of the night and the similarity of
human forms made it impossible for them to distinguish friend from foe
(VII.44-45). The Doric language spoken by both armies also made it
possible for the Sicilians to steal the watchword of the attackers and for
the paeans sung by both sides to strike terror into the hearts of the
Athenians. While the Athenians share a common speech and “forms” with
their enemies, it is the failure to denote particulars—those details that give
to speech and forms their political and human relevance (cf. VI.2)—that
results in a defeat, and in some cases the self-destruction, of the Athenian
force.
The disaster at Epipolae was followed by others. In an effort to save
themselves, the Athenians attempt to “break out” of the Great Harbor.
Thucydides describes their crushing defeat here, one determined as much
by the hoplites on the decks of the triremes as by the triremes themselves,
as a land-battle at sea. The defeated Athenians were thus forced to retreat
over land, with troops suffering from dysentery brought on by their having
encamped near a marshland; that is, their bodies were degraded by flux
brought on by something that wasn’t quite water or land (VII.47). And
while his men suffered from too much flux, Nicias, by contrast, suffered
from an insufficiency of motion (kidney stones). It is this same “Nician
problem” that was responsible for the devastating loss of the fortifications
and materiel at Plemmyrium (VII.74 and 4).
In an earlier effort to extend their siege works, the Athenians tried to
cross the marsh by laying down doors and planks; the same material they
once used to define and distinguish families from each other they now use
for a common purpose: to overcome a categorical obfuscation found in
nature (VI.101). The tactic worked and paved the way for (what should
have been) the successful investment of Syracuse. Though Athens
ultimately fails in Sicily, Thucydides’ artistry tempts us here with the
intriguing possibility that certain, well-defined political forms are critical
to those particular distinctions that make our world intelligible. But the
Athenians rejected these distinctions in their self-interested drive for gain
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and glory. It is perhaps fitting then that their final defeat in Sicily takes
place at the Assinarus river where, Thucydides notes, their exhausted
soldiers “fell in with no order” (VII.84.3) and in the ensuing chaos were
butchered by their enemies; their selfish pursuits dissolve in an excess of
motion that destroys both particularity and the wholes that particularity
helps define.
None of this should come as a surprise. From the very beginning, the
Sicilian campaign was predicated on an almost willful disregard of
political distinctions. Thucydides tells us that the Athenians were ignorant
of Sicily, of its size and its mixed Hellenic and barbarian population
(VI.1.1; even its character as an island, VI.1.2), despite a long experience
with the place (I.44.3, III.86.1, 90.2, 115.2, 115.5, IV.2 and IV.65). When
the Athenians voted for the expedition to Sicily, our author quietly
indicates that while “eros fell upon all alike” (VI.24.3) to set sail there was
still a part of the city that silently objected (VI.24.4). Athens sees a unified
whole where there is yet division. And this political blindness at home
leads to strategic errors abroad. Thus, despite Nicias’ reminders that the
Athenians will need cavalry to counter the Sicilian horse (VI.20.4, 21.1),
the Athenians only take thirty horses with their initial forces (VI.43), a
decision made all the more shocking by the fact that Alcibiades, one of the
commanding generals here, depended on horses for his own Olympic
victory (VI.16.1). Like the Athenians, Alcibiades thinks he is more selfsufficient than he is; had he reflected more deeply on the character of his
own Olympic victory, he might have seen that Athenian success in Sicily
would have required the knights, that part of the community almost
certainly opposed to the expedition. And yet to have recognized this and to
have incorporated the knights into the expedition would have required the
Athenians to limit what they hoped to achieve in light of their essentially
fractured character as a political community. While the disaster in Sicily
provides them with a brutal reminder of their limitations, such an
experience does not lead them to moderate their hopes in the kind of
wholeness that political life can provide. Thucydides’ presentation of the
end of the Athenian expedition to Sicily suggests that the Athenians’
simply substitute their grasp of a regular and predictable nature (VI.70)
with a cosmos whose gods, at this point, must appear to them as arbitrary
and hence inscrutable (VII.53, VII.79; cf. VII.77 and VII.86). Athenian
confidence is replaced by Athenian despair.
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The Structure of the History: Part Four
The destruction of the Athenian force in Sicily shows us the dangers to
both politics and intelligibility of an erotic longing unrestrained by any
limits, natural or divine. We thus leave this story impressed with the need
for moral and intellectual limits. That need, combined with the History’s
critique of our ability to know and thus be guided by categorical wholes
that exist in any pure or absolute sense, recommends to us a return to the
kind of limits that one finds in Greek, and especially Athenian, political
life. We make this return in Book VIII. Here Thucydides charts a course
from a Spartan-like conception of moderation to a measured regime of The
Five Thousand. In Sparta’s three treaties with the Persians (VIII.17-18; 3637; 58), in the oligarchic Four Hundred at Athens (67, 70), and in
Thucydides’ revealing comments about Sparta’s slave population (40), we
see the brutality of “moderation” at work; all of these represent forceful
efforts to put an end to the clash between particular interests, needs, and
conceptions of what is good, just and noble. But at the end of the History
the rule of such “violence” is replaced by a measured regime that joins
together contentious parts of the city without privileging one part over the
others. While not produced by force, it is worth observing here that such a
measured balance was based on an experience with extreme necessity and
not, say, the more traditional (i.e., religious) sources of law and order.
Given that The Five Thousand proved remarkably unstable, devolving
into full-blown democracy not long after it was established, it is unlikely
that Thucydides presents it as an example for other communities to follow.
And yet his praise of this regime suggests that we are to take seriously its
chief virtue and the encounter with necessity of which it is the product.
Such an encounter required the Athenians to see things as they are and not
as they wished them to be. In this case, that meant that parts of the
community, if only temporarily, had to suspend their claim to rule over
others on account of their worth or deserving, on account of their
willingness to accept their limited place in the new political order. This
new, refined view of Greekness can endure only if one works through the
contradictory character of justice, the concern for which fuels the Athenian
hopes for a world in which their superior goodness will be recognized and
rewarded. But to acknowledge and accept the necessity of such
contradictions is also to accept that we cannot hope to know wholes,
categories or forms apart from the adventitious particulars that make them
humanly relevant. It is to accept that we cannot get beyond political life—
the realm of contingency—if we hope to satisfy our concern to know “the
clear truth” (I.20) about human affairs. And this means that our capacity to
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know the world is conditioned by the very insight which occasioned such
knowledge; the problematic character of Greekness provides us with both
the means by which political life can be known for what it is and the
character of that which is to be known.
By being incomplete, the final sentence of the History reflects these
insights into our inability to know wholes. And with its final word it
brings to a close the “twin frame” that opened the work, one possible
interpretation of which is that reason (i.e., “Thucydides”) is itself a form of
generation (i.e., “Artemis”). Or to put it differently, perhaps the kind of
reason embodied in Greekness generates the intelligible conditions on the
basis of which the world can be known and thus can be fully. This
interpretive suggestion can only be raised here. But its possibility should
invite us to think more deeply about the artistry at work in the History and
the artful product in which it issues. Thucydides’ emphasis on Greekness
and its fragility, a fragility reflected in its genesis and decay in the
History’s opening and closing, do not lead him to despair of an enduring
and intelligible order to human nature. It simply means that if we are to
access this order and intelligibility, then we require particularly “Greek”
manifestations of our humanity to come into existence. Human wisdom it
seems requires the presence of a particular kind of politics, one which
Thucydides experienced for himself and which he allows us to experience
in the artfully structured pages of his History.

Works Cited
Ahrensdorf, Peter. 2000. “The Fear of Death and the Longing for
Immortality: Hobbes and Thucydides on Human Nature and the
Problem of Anarchy.” American Political Science Review 94, no. 3:
579-93.
Burns, Timothy. 2010. “What War Discloses.” In Recovering Reason:
Essays in Honor of Thomas L. Pangle, edited by Timothy Burns, 3152. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
—. 2011. “The Virtue of Thucydides’ Brasidas.” The Journal of Politics
73, no. 2: 508-23.
Dobski, Bernard J. 2007. “Thucydides and the Soul of Victory: Olympic
Politics in the Peloponnesian War.” In Socrates: Reason or Unreason
as the Foundation of European Identity, edited by Ann Ward, 98-111.
Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press.
—. 2010. “Thucydides’ Philosophic Turn to Causes.” Interpretation: A
Journal of Political Philosophy 37, no. 2 (winter): 123-55.

32

Chapter Two

Hobbes, Thomas. 1989. “Of the Life and History of Thucydides.” In The
Peloponnesian War: The Complete Hobbes Translation, edited by
David Grene. 569-586. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hornblower, Simon. 1991. Thucydides. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Munn, Mark. 2000. The School of History. Athens in the Age of Socrates.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1977. “Twilight of the Idols.” In The Portable
Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufman. 463-563. New York:
Penguin Books.
Orwin, Clifford. 1989. “Thucydides’ Contest: Thucydidean ‘Methodology’
in Context.” The Review of Politics 51: 345-364
—. 1994. The Humanity of Thucydides. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1979. Emile, or On Education. Translated by
Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books.
Strauss, Leo. 1963. “On Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesians and
Athenians.” In The City and Man. 139-241. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

